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Abramovsky and Edelstein: Prosecutorial Readiness

PROSECUTORIAL READINESS, SPEEDY TRIAL AND THE
ABSENT DEFENDANT: HAS NEW YORK'S 25-YEAR
DILEMMA FINALLY BEEN RESOLVED?
Abraham Abramovsky and Jonathan I. Edelstein'

INTRODUCTION
Few provisions of New York State's criminal procedure law have
been as often litigated, or have been the subject of as much
invective, as section 30.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law,' which

provides that the prosecution must be ready for trial within specific
time limits following the commencement of a criminal action.2 Of
* Professor of Law, Fordlam University Law School; Director,
International Criminal Law Center. J.D., 1971, State University of New York
at Buffalo; LL.M, 1972, J.S.D., 1976, Columbia University.
** J.D., 1997, Fordham University Law School. This Article is dedicated
to the memory of Albert Edelstein (1937-1996) and David T. Eames (19541998).
N.Y. CRim. PRoc. LAW § 30.30 (McKinney 1992).
2 See, e.g., People v. Neal, 160 Misc. 2d 173, 607 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct.
New York County 1994). For example, Justice Rena K. Uviller of the New
York County Supreme Court has described New York's readiness statute as
follows: "Speedy trial motions have become a judge's, if not a litigant's,
nightmare. The opaque language of N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30 resists
clarification by judicial interpretation. What follows is yet another attempt to
understand this misbegotten statute." Id. at 173, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 867. See
also Joseph Neff, The Reign of the Coddled Criminal, NEws AND OBSERVER
(RALEIGH), Mar. 31, 1996, at G3. In his article, Joseph Neff has referred to
CPL § 30.30 as "a mechanistic nightmare passed in 1972 and never reviewed
since." Id. HAROLD J. ROThVAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN
CRZNAL JUSTICE (1995).
In addition, New York State Supreme Court
Justice Harold Rothwax has castigated CPL § 30.30 as a technical statute
which has set free criminals whose guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 185.
This denunciation may have been inspired by the fact that CPL § 30.30 is an
entirely technical statute which is entirely unconcerned with the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. However, the readiness requirement set forth in
CRIM. PROC. LAw § 30.30 has an important and entirely legitimate purpose to protect a criminal defendant from the uncertainty of an unending
prosecution. The abuses which would be possible if the prosecution had an
unlimited amount of time to prepare for trial are too numerous to list here;

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 [1998], Art. 2

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 15

the provisions of New York Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30, few
have inspired as much confusion and critical attention, in the
Legislature and the courts, as CPL § 30.30(4)(c). This statute,
which addresses the exclusion of time in cases where the defendant
is absent or otherwise unavailable to answer the charges against
him, has been amended twice in response to judicial decisions
which were seen as providing undeserved benefit to fugitive felons. 3
Under section 30.30, New York prosecutors must be ready for
trial within a specific time following the commencement of a
criminal action, depending upon the severity of the offense
charged.' Failure to meet the deadlines provided by statute will
result in an automatic sanction of dismissal.' To mitigate this harsh
penalty and allow for necessary delays, however, the statute allows
a prosecutor to exclude certain periods from the time in which he
must prepare his case. One of the most controversial of these
exclusions is outlined in CPL § 30.30(4)(c), which pertains to cases
in which the defendant has become a fugitive from justice.
Simply put, CPL § 30.30(4)(c) allows the prosecution to exclude
delays stemming from the "absence" or "unavailability" of a
defendant.' It is the definition of "absence" or "unavailability"
which has led to both confusion and controversy. According to the
original version of CPL § 30.30(4)(c), a defendant was considered
"absent" when his location was unknown and he was attempting to
avoid prosecution or his location could not be determined through
due diligence. 7 Similarly, a defendant was deemed "unavailable"
several of the most obvious, however, include the ability to hold an indictment
over the head of a defendant indefinitely, the ability to postpone trial until vital
witnesses or evidence are no longer available to the defendant, and the ability
to delay a criminal action in anticipation of a favorable judicial decision on a
pertinent issue.
This Article considers the recent amendments to CRIM. PROC. LAW

§ 30.30(4)(c) in light of both of these viewpoints.
3 See infra notes 79-151 and accompanying text (concerning the legislative
and judicial history of CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30(4)( c)).
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30(1). The time limits provided by the
statute range from 180 days for a felony to 30 days for a petty offense. Id.
I id.
6 Id. § 30.30(4)(c).
7 Ch. 184, § 2, 1972 N.Y. Laws 398-401.
4
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when his location was known, but he could not be brought to trial
through the exercise of due diligence by the prosecution.'
The confusion surrounding this statute has centered on the
circumstances under which prosecutors are required to exercise due
diligence in locating a defendant, especially in cases where bench
warrants have been issued. Both legislative amendments to CPL
§ 30.30(4)(c), as well as an inordinate number of judicial decisions,
have addressed the question of how far law enforcement authorities
must go in enforcing bench warrants in order to avoid the risk of
dismissal.
The Legislature's most recent attempt to resolve the confusion
surrounding CPL § 30.30(4)(c) occurred in 1996, when the statute
was amended to provide a much wider exclusion of time amounting almost to a blanket exclusion - in cases where bench
warrants had been issued for absent defendants. 9 Although the
1996 amendments significantly clarify the extent to which the
prosecution may exclude delays stemming from the enforcement of
bench warrants, several key questions remain as to prosecutors'
obligations to locate absent defendants and bring them to trial.
The first of these, and perhaps the farthest-reaching in practical
terms, is the issue of whether the prosecution may gain an openended exclusion of time simply by filing a bench warrant. In a
decade-old decision which may prove prophetic, a New York trial
court predicted that a blanket exclusion of time in bench warrant
cases may lead to a policy of "filing and forgetting warrants" in
order to avoid the readiness requirements of CPL § 30.30.'o

Notwithstanding the 1996 amendments, there is some authority for
the contention that law enforcement agencies may not establish a
policy of issuing warrants they do not intend to enforce."
S id.

9 Ch. 631, 1996 N.Y. Laws 1327; see also infra notes 126-49 and
accompanying text (discussing the circumstances surrounding the 1996
amendments).
"0People v. Garrett, 146 Misc. 2d 919, 926, 553 N.Y.S.2d 948, 952 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Kings County 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 171 A.D.2d 153, 575
N.Y.S.2d 93 (2d Dep't 1991), lv. denied, 79 N.Y.2d 827, 588 N.E.2d 105,
580 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1991).

" See infra notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
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In addition, while it is difficult at first glance to summon any
sympathy for an absent defendant against whom a bench warrant is
outstanding, a closer examination reveals that a universal exclusion
may lead to injustice. While bench warrants may be issued against
some defendants because they deliberately fled from prosecution,
warrants are also issued against individuals who are absent simply
because they have never been informed of the charges against them.
Moreover, a third category of defendant may become subject to a
bench warrant - a defendant who has appeared in court but,
through bureaucratic mishap, is not properly informed of the date
of his next appearance.' 2 Finally, a defendant may be prevented
from returning to court due to circumstances beyond his control,
such as accidental injury or arrest in another jurisdiction. While the
second category of defendant is protected by the current version of
CPL § 30.30, the two final categories are not. 3
The second unresolved issue concerns the constitutionality of
CPL § 30.30(4)(c) as a whole. In a pair of recent decisions, the
Second Circuit established a constitutional obligation upon
prosecutors to exercise due diligence in locating absent defendants,
even in cases where the defendant has fled the jurisdiction.' 4 This
duty, however, has not been recognized outside the Second Circuit,
and has been severely limited even within the circuit; thus, a
Federal constitutional challenge to CPL § 30.30(4)(c) may well be a
pyrrhic victory at best for the challenger. 5
Accordingly, this article will examine the open issues relating to
CPL § 30.30(4)(c) in the context of the prior legislative and judicial
history surrounding the right to speedy trial, both in New York and
Federal jurisdictions.
Part I of this article will outline the
development of absent defendants' right to speedy trial 6 in New
2

See People v. Drummond, 215 A.D.2d 579, 629 N.Y.S.2d 55 (2d Dep't

1995).
'3 N.Y. CuM. PROC. LAW § 30.30(4)(c)(ii) (McKinney 1992).
" See infra notes 229-49 and accompanying text (discussing United States v.
Diacolios 837 F.2d 79, Rayborn v. Scully, 858 F.2d 84 and their progeny).
"5See infra notes 250-60 and accompanying text.
16 CRiM. PROC. LAW § 30.30 is, strictly speaking, a readiness rule rather than
a speedy trial statute. See Peter Preiser, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30
practice commentary at 172 (McKinney 1992).

The constitutional right to
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Part II will analyze the framework under which absent

defendants' CPL § 30.30 claims are currently adjudicated. Part III
will examine the remaining issues left unresolved by the 1996
amendments to CPL § 30.30(4)(c). In conclusion, this article will

attempt to suggest a proper resolution to these issues.
I.

UP AND WAIT:
YURR

AN INCOMPLETE

HISTORY OF N.Y. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

§ 30.30(4)(c)
A. The Majority Rule Priorto 1968
The period from 1968 through 1972 marked a significant
change in speedy trial jurisprudence, both in New York State and

throughout the United States. Prior to 1968, the right to speedy
trial was one of the most vaguely defined constitutional rights,
both at common law and in federal and state statutes.' 7 This led

to such inconsistencies as a pretrial delay of one year being held
by one court to be prima facie evidence of a denial of the right to

speedy trial in New York is protected by a very broadly worded statute, CRIM.
PROC. LAw § 30.20, which is usually, although not always, considered in
conjunction with CPINM. PROC. LAw § 30.30. However, as a trial cannot occur
before the prosecution is ready, violation of a readiness statute necessarily
implicates the right to speedy trial. Moreover, discussions of the policy
reasons behind prosecutorial readiness rules have almost invariably centered on
the constitutional right to speedy trial. See, e.g., United States v. Salzmann,
Accordingly, the
417 F. Supp. 1139, 1145-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
constitutionality of CPL § 30.30 or any provision thereof must be evaluated in
light of New York and Federal speedy trial jurisprudence.
17 Salzmann, 417 F. Supp. at 1146.
The Salzmann court discussed the
history of speedy trial jurisprudence prior to the 1970's as follows:
The Supreme Court had dealt with the Speedy Trial Clause
of the Sixth Amendment only infrequently, most of the
decisions having been handed down in the last two decades.
Lower courts were frustrated in applying the Clause not only
because of the paucity of appellate rulings but also because of
the nature of the guidance.
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speedy trial, while another court held that a delay of 18 years did
not violate the Constitution.18
This vagueness existed, at least in part, by design, as the right to
speedy trial "is generically different from any of the other rights
enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the accused."' 19
In contrast with the other constitutional rights available to criminal
defendants, deprivation of the right to speedy trial might actually
work to the benefit of the accused. 20 Time is often on the side of a
criminal defendant; delays, especially if prolonged, might weaken
the prosecution's case as witnesses' memories dim and physical
evidence is lost or misplaced. 2' As the prosecution carries the
burden of proof, the damage to the prosecution's case over time
might in some instances be far more than the corresponding damage
to the defense.22 Accordingly, "deprivation of the right to speedy
trial does not [always] prejudice the accused's ability to defend

himself. "23
For this reason, the majority of state and federal jurisdictions
prior to 1968 set difficult standards for defendants seeking to assert
their right to speedy trial. More than thirty states and the majority
of federal appellate courts recognized the "demand rule," limiting
the assertion of the right to those cases in which the defendant
demanded a speedy trial. 24
See House Report on the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, H.R. REP. No. 931503 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7401, 7404.
18

'9 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).
20 Id.

at 521 (holding that "[dielay is not an uncommon defense tactic.").

21 id.
22
23

24

Id.
Id.

Id. at 523-24 and cases cited therein.

The majority of jurisdictions

recognizing a demand rule applied the "demand-waiver" rule, under which
failure to demand speedy trial operated as an absolute waiver of the right. Id.
at 524 n.22. The First, Second, Eighth and Ninth Circuits recognized a more
flexible rule in which demand was a factor which was considered in evaluating
a defendant's assertion of the right to speedy trial, but allowing assertion of the
right in the absence of demand in exceptional cases. Id. at 524 n.23; see also
Bandy v. United States, 408 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1969); Moser v. United States,
381 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1967); United States ex. rel. Solomon v. Mancusi, 412
F.2d 88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 936 (1969); United States v. Butler,
426 F.2d 1275, 1278 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 978 (1971).
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In cases involving fugitive or absent defendants, the demand rule
by definition operated as a nearly absolute bar to assertion of the
right to speedy trial. A fugitive defendant, who is seeldng to avoid
trial entirely, is unlikely to surface for the purpose of demanding an
expeditious prosecution.2 However, the demand rule worked not
only against fugitives, but also against defendants who were
unrepresented by counsel and unaware of their right to speedy
trial,26 or to those who were simply unaware that charges were
outstanding against them and that they were being sought for
prosecution. 7

B. The New York Rule Priorto 1970

New York State, however, went far beyond the majority in
recognizing a broad equitable right to speedy trial. In 1955, New
York rejected the demand rule, adopting a more liberal construction
of the right to speedy trial. In People v. Prosser,8 the New York
Court of Appeals considered the case of a defendant who was
rearraigned on a six-year-old indictment after an appellate court
ruled that he must be released from prison because he had been
improperly sentenced on a prior conviction. 29 After being
' See Bruce A. Green, 'Hare and Hounds7: The Fugitive Defendant's
ConstitutionalRight to Be Pursued, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 439, 454-55 (1990).
Prior to the 1960s, a defendant's flight from justice was generally construed as
a waiver of speedy trial. Id. at 455. This rule was applied to defendants who
absconded before being arrested as well as cases in which the defendant was
arrested and later jumped bail or otherwise absented himself from the court's
jurisdiction. Id.
26 See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 398 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1080, (1969) (holding that the demand rule applied to
defendant who was not represented by counsel and not informed by the court
or the prosecution of his right to speedy trial).
27 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, SPEEDY TRIAL 17 n.17 ("ABA Standards") (Approved Draft 1968)
("[Olne reason for [rejection of the demand-waiver rule] is that there are a
number of situations, such as where the defendant is unaware of the
").Id.
charge.., in which it is unfair to require a demand ....
28 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891(1955).
29 Id. at 355, 30 N.E.2d at 893.
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convicted of burglary and grand larceny, the defendant was
sentenced to consecutive prison terms of five to ten and five to
twenty years.30
The defendant appealed his conviction on the grounds that his
right to speedy trial had been violated. 3 The Fourth Department
condemned the delay, but held that the defendant had waived his
right to speedy trial by failing to demand dismissal pursuant to
Section 668 of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure at the
time of trial.32
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that "[ilt is the state
which initiates the [criminal] action, and it is the state which must
see that the defendant is arraigned." 3 3 The Prosser court held
further that the plain language of Section 668, which required the
prosecution affirmatively to establish good cause for its own delay,
indicated that "mere failure of the defendant to take affirmative
action to prevent delay may not, without more, be construed or
treated as a waiver. "3 The Court of Appeals went on to cite
several equitable factors in support of a more flexible rule, noting
that a rigid demand rule could allow the prosecution to delay trials
for periods longer than the statute of limitations 35 and that it would
be inappropriate to require the defendant to demand a speedy trial

30 Id.
31 Id.

32Id. Section 668 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, enacted in 1849,
provided the means by which a criminal defendant in New York could enforce
his right to speedy trial, stating that:
If a defendant, indicted for a crime whose trial has not been
postponed upon his application, be not brought to trial at the
next term of the court in which the indictment is triable, after
it is found the court may, on application of the defendant,
order the indictment to be dismissed, unless good cause to
the contrary is shown.
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. LAW § 668 (1849), repealed Ch. 996, 1970 N.Y.
Laws 2147-2461.
33 Prosser, 309 N.Y. at 358, 130 N.E.2d at 895.

34 id.
31 Id. at 359, 130 N.E.2d at 895, citing Report of the Commissioners on
Practice and Pleading at 342 (1849).
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in cases which had apparently been abandoned on the prosecution's
36

own initiative.
Trial court decisions subsequent to Prosser interpreted the New
York rule to require the prosecution to exercise due diligence in
apprehending defendants who were unaware of the charges against
them or who were living openly within the court's jurisdiction. For
example, in People v. Serio,37 the Erie County Court considered the
case of a defendant indicted for grand larceny in October 1946
while serving a sentence in a California prison.38 The Erie County
District Attorney obtained a warrant against the defendant and
forwarded it to the California prison as a detainer, but later recalled
the warrant with the explanation that "the District Attorney of Erie
County 'would not send for Serio as his sentence [in California]
may have taught him a lesson." 39 However, the District Attorney
reserved the right to enforce the warrant if the defendant returned to
Buffalo. 40
The defendant, Frank Serio, did in fact return to Buffalo in 1952.
For the next six years, Serio lived openly in Buffalo, was gainfully
employed, was listed in the Buffalo telephone directory, and
appeared in court in connection with the administration of his
sister's estate. 4' During that time, Serio had no trouble with the
law - until the Erie County District Attorney decided without
warning to bring him to trial on the 1946 indictment.
Upon the defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded
that the defendant had no duty "to announce his availability for
arraignment and trial to the District Attorney, or as Ogden Nash
might have phrased it: 'Dear Sir: My name is Barbara North, I'll
be ready for trial on the 24th."' 41 Citing Serio's open residence in
Buffalo and the 12-year dormancy of the indictment, the County
Court applied the Prosser rule to pre-arraignment delays and held
Prosser,309 N.Y. at 360, 130 N.E.2d at 896.
37 13 Misc. 2d 973, 181 N.Y.S.2d 340 (Erie County Ct. 1958).
38 Id. at 974, 181 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
39 id.
36

4

id.

41 Id.
42

Id. at 975, 181 N.Y.S.2d at 342.
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that the prosecution had a duty to exercise diligence in obtaining
absent defendants for arraignment and trial.43
The Nassau County Court's decision in People v. Morton,44 and
subsequent appellate litigation, demonstrate the limits of the pre1970 New York rule. In Morton, the trial court dismissed a sevenyear-old indictment against a defendant who had resided openly in
adjoining Queens County during the period between indictment and
trial.45 Although the defendant had maintained a New York State
driver's license in his own name and filed federal and state income
tax returns, law enforcement authorities made no attempt to locate
him by means of motor vehicle or tax records. 6 Instead, the
prosecutor's efforts to bring him to trial consisted of inquiries to his
brother, his previous employer and to authorities in South Carolina,
where he had relatives.47 Upon the defendant's motion to dismiss,
the trial court stated that "[i]t seems inconceivable that the
authorities did not make inquiry of such agencies as the taxing
authorities or motor vehicle bureau in an effort to secure
information as to defendant's whereabouts. 48 The defendant, who
was living openly within the jurisdiction, was "not ...a 'fugitive'
who should be denied the beneficial effects of section
668 ...solely because the indictment was returned and a
superficial investigation failed to yield his whereabouts., 49 By
1966, therefore, some New York trial courts recognized a
prosecutorial obligation to conduct a diligent search for absent
defendants similar to the obligation, which would later be codified
under CPL §30.30(4)(c).
The Court of Appeals, however, ultimately reversed the
determination of the Nassau County Court in Morton, declining to
adopt the Prosser rule in connection with defendants who had
removed themselves from the jurisdiction of the trial court.5 0 In
43 id.
450

Misc. 2d 890, 271 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Nassau County Ct. 1966).

4 Id. at 891, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
46 Id.

47 Id.
48 Id. at 893, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
49 Id.

" People v. Morton, 22 N.Y.2d 674, 238 N.E.2d 755, 291 N.Y.S.2d 367
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doing so, the Court of Appeals adopted the holding of the Appellate
Division dissent; namely, that the defendant waived his right to
speedy trial by failing to notify the police of his whereabouts. 5
Thus, although a prosecutor could not be excused for failing to
locate a defendant within his jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals
declined to extend this rule to require a diligent search for a
defendant who resided in a county outside the jurisdiction of the
court in which he was indicted. It would be several more years
before the requirement of prosecutorial due diligence became firmly
entrenched in New York.
C. 1968-72: The Rise of Readiness Rules
The 1960s saw a dramatic increase in pretrial delays in
jurisdictions throughout the United States.- Between 1960 and
1970, for example, the number of criminal cases filed in federal
district courts increased by approximately one third, with no
corresponding increase in judgeships.' In a trend mirrored in state
jurisdictions, the median time interval between filing and
disposition in federal criminal cases more than doubled between
1963 and

54

19 7 2 .

Accordingly, the prevailing laxity in enforcing

the right to speedy trial gave way to "[e]nthusiasm for Speedy Trial
Plans that would define with some precision the outer limits of
permissible delay. ...

."5

In February 1968, the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association approved a comprehensive model standard relating to
speedy trial, which went far beyond the constitutional requirements
of contemporary case law. 6 The ABA standards rejected the
loosely defined speedy trial concept which had developed at
common law, recommending instead that states establish rules
(1968).
"' Id.; affirming People v. Morton, 28 A.D.2d 913, 914, 282 N.Y.S.2d 960,
961 (2d Dep't 1967) (Rabin and Nolan, JJ., dissenting).
52 United States v. Salzmann, 417 F. Supp. 1139, 1145 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
53 d. at 1146.
4 Id. at 1145.
-"Id. at 1146.
56 Id. at 1147-48; see also Green, supra note 25, at 457.
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mandating dismissal in cases where defendants were not brought to
trial within a specified period of time.57 These differed from prior

speedy trial rules in that they were completely objective and
universally applicable.
Although the ABA standards indicated that delay beyond a certain
point was "inherently prejudicial, "58 they contained certain
exceptions under which justifiable delays would not be counted
against the prosecution. 9 Among the exceptions addressed by the
ABA standards was delay caused by an absent defendant.
The ABA standards followed the common law in recommending
that a fugitive defendant - that is, one who is actively avoiding

prosecution -may not complain of pretrial delay, whether or not the
government has endeavored to locate him, 60 However, the ABA
standards departed from the majority rule in obligating the
prosecution to search for absent defendants 6' who were merely
unaware of the charges against them. 62 The ABA's model rule
went beyond even the developing standard of due diligence in New
York, by imposing a duty upon the prosecution to pursue even
those defendants who were living openly outside the jurisdiction.63
In such circumstances, pretrial delay would be excused only if the

17 Salzmann, 417 F. Supp. at 1148-49. The drafters of the ABA Standards
refrained from selecting a specific time frame during which a defendant must
be brought to trial. Id. at 1149.

58 Id.

59 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 27.
60 Id. at § 2.3(e);
61 The obligation

see also Green, supra note 25, at 458.
of the prosecution to search for an absent defendant who
was unaware of the charges against him, although not recognized under the
majority rule, came into increasing acceptance at common law independently
of the ABA Standards following the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v.
Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969). The Smith decision established an obligation on
prosecutors to exercise due diligence in obtaining the presence of a defendant
who is incarcerated in another jurisdiction. Id. at 383. Following the Smith
decision, a number of lower courts expanded the rule of due diligence to
provide that "the government must try to locate defendants who are ignorant of
the charges against them and who, like prisoners, are unable to appear in court
of their own volition." Green, supra note 25, at 460.
62 ABA STANDARDS, § 2.3(e).
63

Id.
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defendant's location could not be ascertained by due diligence, or if
efforts to obtain the defendant's presence were resisted.'
In the period immediately after 1968, many state jurisdictions and
federal appellate courts adopted readiness statutes or rules based on
the ABA standards.' Among these jurisdictions were New York
State and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, which promulgated a comprehensive rule regarding speedy
disposition of criminal cases in 1971.67 Following the ABA
recommendations, the Second Circuit established a mechanical
formula under which prosecutors who were not ready for trial
within six months of the commencement of a criminal action would
be sanctioned by dismissal. 6s The Second Circuit rule also followed
the ABA standards in tolling the six-month limitation in cases
where a defendant is "absent" or "unavailable." 69 The Second
Circuit defined "absence" and "unavailability" as follows:
A defendant should be considered absent whenever his
location is unknown and in addition he is attempting to avoid
apprehension or prosecution or his location cannot be
determined by due diligence.
A defendant should be
considered unavailable whenever his location is known but
his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due
diligence .... '
Accordingly, federal prosecutors in the Second Circuit had a clear
duty to conduct a diligent search for any defendant whose location

64

Id. The ABA Standards were the first speedy trial standards to explicitly

use the term "due diligence" in connection with the prosecution's duty to

locate the absent defendant. See id.
Green, supra note 25, at 457.

6 See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (discussing the enactment of
CRim. PROC. LAW § 30.30).
67 Salzmann, 417 F. Supp. at 1148.

6 id.
I Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases, 2D. CIR R. 5(d).
0 Id.
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was unknown and who was not actively attempting to avoid
prosecution.7 '
In addition, in the landmark 1972 decision of Barker v. Wingo, 72
the Supreme Court rejected the demand rule and explicitly
permitted objective readiness rules of the type recommended by the
ABA, although it declined to require such a mechanical rule as a
matter of constitutional principle." Under Barker, which is the
foundation of modem speedy trial jurisprudence, the rigid demand
rule was replaced by a flexible test under which the defendant's
demand for speedy trial was only one of four factors to be
considered in determining whether his right had been violated. In
addition to the timeliness of the defendant's demand, the Barker test
mandates that courts consider the length of pretrial delay, the
reason for the delay and the prejudice to the defendant.75 The
Barker decision placed the burden on the government to justify
delays in bringing defendants to trial, specifically including
negligence as a factor that should weigh against the government in
76
determining whether the right to speedy trial had been violated.
Moreover, the Barker Court specified that the timeliness of a
defendant's assertion of his right to speedy trial is affected by the
reason for the delay.77 Thus, it would seem that the Barker
decision mandates inquiry into whether the prosecution acted
7' The

United States as a whole adopted a mechanical readiness rule for all

federal jurisdictions with the enactment of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18

U.S.C. § 3161 (1998). The Speedy Trial Act, however, contained a looser
definition of the "absent" defendant, defining the term simply to mean any

defendant whose location was unknown to the prosecution. Thus, the Speedy
Trial Act stopped short of imposing an obligation to conduct a diligent search

for absent defendants even where they were ignorant of the charges against
them or otherwise not actively avoiding prosecution.
72407 U.S. 514 (1972).

73 Id. at 523-26.
'4Id. at 530.
75 Id.
76

Id. at 531.

"A more neutral reason such as negligence ... should be

weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate
responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather
than with the defendant." Id.
7nId.
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diligently in carrying out its responsibility of informing78 the
defendant of the charges against him and bringing him to trial.
D. The Enactment of CPL §30.30(4)(c)
In 1970, New York State repealed the Code of Criminal

Procedure and replaced it with an entirely new Criminal Procedure
Law, which had been designed by a panel of experts appointed by
then-Governor Rockefeller. 79 Among the earliest amendments to
the new Criminal Procedure Law, adopted in 1972, was a
mechanical readiness rule modeled after the ABA's proposed
speedy trial standards.' ° Like the ABA standards and the Second
Circuit speedy trial rule, section 30.30 of the new Criminal
Procedure Law tolled the prosecutorial readiness deadline in cases
where delay was caused by a fugitive defendant.

As originally enacted, CPL § 30.30(4)(c) provided that the
prosecution was entitled to exclude delays caused by the "absence"
78 New York State defines the right to speedy trial in similar, although not
identical, terms to the Supreme Court's Barker test. The New York test for
determining whether a defendant's right to speedy trial has been violated was
set down in People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442, 335 N.E.2d 303, 373
N.Y.S.2d 79 (1975). The Taranovich court outlined a five-factor test,
including the extent of the delay, the reasons for delay, the nature of the
underlying charge, whether or not there has been an extended period of
pretrial incarceration, and whether the defense has been prejudiced by the
delay. Id. at 445. The Taranovich test is thus more liberal than the Barker
test in that it makes no mention at all of the defendant's responsibility to
demand a speedy trial.
79 Ch. 996, 1970 N.Y. Laws 2147-2461. The Criminal Procedure Law was
based upon the work of the Temporary State Commission on Revision of the
Penal Law and Criminal Code, which was appointed in 1961 by Governor
Rockefeller to revamp New York's substantive and procedural criminal
statutes. The adoption of the Criminal Procedure Law followed the enactment
of an entirely new Penal Law in 1965, which represented the Commission's
recommendations on substantive criminal legislation. Among the innovations
enacted as part of the Criminal Procedure Law were a restructuring of the
lower criminal court system and the adoption of a clearly defined discovery
rule in criminal cases. Governor's Memorandum on Chapter 996 of the Laws
of 1970, reprintedin 1970 N.Y. Laws 3140-41.
so Ch. 184, § 2, 1972 N.Y. Laws 398-401.
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or "unavailability" of a defendant, defining those terms in language
nearly identical to that used by the Second Circuit.8' The language
of CPL § 30.30(4)(c) was straightforward, and its rationale was
pure common sense, predicated on the notion that dismissal of
charges against fugitive defendants would "breed contempt for law
and the judicial process generally and especially among defendants
who receive a bonanza for negligent or intentional failure to return
to court." 82 Within a short time after its enactment, however, this
statute was thrown into confusion through judicial interpretation.
In 1976, the Court of Appeals considered the case of Rita
Roberta Sturgis, against whom a felony complaint had been filed in
Monroe County on April 2, 1973, charging possession of a loaded
firearm and escape in the second degree.83 Seven months after the
filing of the felony complaint, Sturgis was indicted and the case
placed on the calendar of the Monroe County Court. 4 Following
her arraignment, Sturgis moved to dismiss the charges against her
on the grounds that the prosecution was not ready for trial within
six months of the filing of the felony complaint.85 Her motion was
denied, and she was subsequently convicted of escape.86 Following
her conviction, she appealed.
For much of the period between the filing of the felony complaint
and her arrest on November 26, 1973, Sturgis was certainly
"absent" under the definition of CPL § 30.30(4)(c).87 During
August 1973, bench warrants were issued against her by three
81 Id.

82 Memorandum of the New York State Executive Department, reprinted in
1972 N.Y. Laws 3259; see also In Re Jose R., 83 N.Y.2d 388, 632 N.E.2d
1260, 60 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1993).
83 People v. Sturgis, 38 N.Y.2d 625, 627, 345 N.E.2d 331, 332, 381
N.Y.S.2d 860, 861 (1976).

4 id.
85 Id. N.Y. CRIvI. PROC. LAW § 30.30 (McKinney 1992) requires that the

prosecution be ready for trial within 180 days of the commencement of any
criminal action which contains at least one felony count. N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 30.30(1)(a) (McKinney 1992).
86 Sturgis, 38 N.Y.2d at 626, 345 N.E.2d at 332, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
87 Id. at 628, 345 N.E.2d at 332-333, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
"Under the
instant facts, the County Court had a right to find that, from August 18 to
November 26, 1973, defendant was absent." Id.
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separate town courts in Monroe County for failure to appear on
unrelated criminal charges.m In October, she was arrested under an
alias in another county, and subsequently failed to appear in court
there before finally
being arrested in Rochester on yet another
9
8

criminal charge.

By any fair measure, Sturgis was actively avoiding prosecution;
thus, the district attorney argued that he was not required to conduct
a diligent search for her or even to advance the trial process in her
absence. The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed. Citing the
language of CPL § 30.30(4)(c), which allowed exclusion of delays
"resulting from the absence or unavailability of the defendant," the
Sturgis court held that absence or unavailability was insufficient by
itself to justify an exclusion. 90 Rather, the court held that periods of
time during which a defendant was absent or unavailable were not
excludable unless the delay resulted directly from the absence or
unavailability. 9' Since the prosecutor could have indicted Sturgis in
her absence, the Court of Appeals concluded that the seven-month
delay in presenting the indictment did not result from Sturgis'
absence and that she was therefore entitled to reversal of her
conviction and dismissal of the indictment against her.9
A number of subsequent decisions applied Sturgis stringently,
requiring the prosecution to carry the burden of proving that delays
in readiness were caused by the defendant's absence. For instance,
in People v. Hamilton,93 the Court of Appeals held that the
prosecution had failed to adequately prove that the defendant's
absence resulted in an increased need to investigate.94 Similarly,
the court in People v. Foyd95 dismissed an indictment under CPL

8

ld.
d. at 627, 345 N.E.2d at 331, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
90 Id. at 628, 345 N.E.2d at 333, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
9

91Id.

92 id.

46 N.Y.2d 932, 388 N.E.2d 345, 415 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1977).
9 Id. at 933, 388 N.E.2d at 345, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
9 61 A.D.2d 844, 402 N.Y.S.2d 418 (2d Dep't 1978).
93
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§ 30.30(4)(c) on the grounds that the prosecution failed to offer
reasons to justify its delay.96
The Court of Appeals, however, left one possibility open as a
means of excusing pretrial delays in cases where the defendant had
become a fugitive. In People v. Williams,9 the high court stated in
dicta that district attorneys might absolve themselves of

responsibility for pretrial delays in such cases by instituting a
uniform policy of refusing to go forward with the prosecution of
unavailable defendants. 9 If such a policy were instituted, pretrial
delays in cases where defendants were absent would be attributable
to the policy - and therefore to the defendant's absence." Thus, the
requirements of Sturgis would be technically satisfied.

In People v. Bratton,'0 the Second Department ruled that a
Westchester County policy of not indicting unavailable defendants

was "a reasonable exception to the Sturgis rule." "' Such a policy,
in the court's view, "serves to enhance the capacity and the ability
to efficiently prosecute those defendants who are available without

infringing unreasonably on the rights of those who are not."'
Shortly after the Bratton decision, the Westchester County Court
cited it with approval, noting that "the law abhors the doing of
useless acts" and that "were the People to obtain an indictment in
the defendant's absence, the trial could not proceed even in
Id. at 844, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 418; see also People v. Blackford, 62 A.D.2d
1173, 404 N.Y.S.2d 469 (4th Dep't 1978); People v. Stanton, 71 A.D.2d 932,
419 N.Y.S.2d 717 (2d Dep't 1979); People v. Thill, 75 A.D.2d 709, 427
N.Y.S.2d 125 (4th Dep't 1980); People v. Rice, 87 A.D.2d 894, 449
N.Y.S.2d 522 (2d Dep't 1982).
97 56 N.Y.2d 824, 438 N.E.2d 104, 452 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1982).
98 Id. at 826, 438 N.E.2d at 104, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
99 See People v. Bratton, 103 A.D.2d 368, 480 N.Y.S.2d 324 (2d Dept.
96

1983) aff'd 65 N.Y.2d 675, 481 N.E.2d 255, 491 N.Y.S. 2d 623 (1985).
1
00Id.
101 People v. Leone, 105 A.D.2d 757, 481 N.Y.S.2d 186 (2d Dep't 1984)
(citing Bratton, 103 A.D.2d at 373-74, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 327). The Bratton
court "held an extensive hearing on the policy of the Westchester County
District Attorney's office regarding absent defendants" and determined that a
nonindictment policy existed, although in unwritten form. Bratton, 103
A.D.2d at 369, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 325; see also People v. Escoto, 121 Misc. 2d
957, 964, 470 N.Y.S.2d 270, 274 (Westchester County Ct. 1983).
"-'Leone, 105 A.D.2d at 758, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
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absentia."' ! 3 The court reasoned that the Bratton exclusion would
prevent the conversion of CPL § 30.30(4)(c) "from. . . a shield
into a sword."4
Similar policies, however, were not adopted outside Westchester
County, and the Court of Appeals never specifically recognized the
Bratton exception. In the meantime, the Sturgis standard continued
to produce adverse results for law enforcement. In People v.
Colon,'05 a 1983 decision involving a defendant who had three

outstanding bench warrants for failure to answer desk appearance
tickets over an 18-month period, the Court of Appeals reached a
result similar to that of the Sturgis case.
At the time of the
defendant's arrest on December 22, 1980, more than three months
had elapsed since the return date on the most recently issued
ticket.1°6 At that time, the prosecution had not converted the desk
appearance tickets into jurisdictionally sufficient informations and
was thus not ready for trial.' 7 Since the prosecutor could have
filed sufficient informations without the defendant's presence, the
Court of Appeals found that the delays in bringing him to trial did

o3 Escoto, 121 Misc. 2d at 965, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
104 Id. at 964-65, 470 N.Y.S. 2d at 274. The existence of the non-indictment
policy in Westchester County led to a curious motion for dismissal in the
Westchester County Court some two years later. The policy of the
Westchester District Attorney contained an exception under which fugitive
"career criminals" would be indicted in absentia, despite the general practice
of not indicting absent suspects. People v. Lugo, 140 A.D.2d 715, 716, 528
N.Y.S.2d 895 at 896 (2d Dep't 1988). The defendant in Lugo, who was
arrested following an absence of more than two years, argued that he was a
career criminal and that the District Attorney's failure to indict him was
therefore not due to his absence. Id. The Second Department, however, held
that "the enforcement of the policy exception [for career criminals] was totally
discretionary" and that the defendant was thus not protected by the Sturgis
rule. Id. (citing Bratton, 103 A.D.2d at 373-74, 480 N.Y.S. 2d at 327-28).
The Lugo case remains as very possibly the only instance in which a criminal
defendant felt it was to his best advantage to insist he was a career criminal.
'05 59 N.Y.2d 921, 453 N.E.2d 548, 466 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1983).
1 6 Id.
Each desk appearance ticket charged the defendant with a
misdemeanor, for which the prosecutorial readiness deadline in New York is
90 days. N.Y. CPM. PRoc. LAW § 30.30(l)(b) (McKinney 1992).
"o'Colon, 59 N.Y.2d 921, 453 N.E.2d 548, 466 N.Y.S.2d 319.
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not result from his absence and he was therefore entitled to
dismissal.'o
E. The 1984 Amendments and the Bench Warrant Question
The Sturgis and Colon decisions created a legal climate which
was unacceptable to law enforcement. Under the Court of Appeals'
interpretation of CPL § 30.30(4)(c), prosecutors were "forced to
present cases to grand juries even after defendants have jumped
bail" or else risk dismissal for failure to achieve readiness within
the statutory time limit.'09 Prompted into action by the Colon
decision, the New York State Legislature amended CPL
§ 30.30(4)(c) in 1984 to provide for an exclusion for "the period
extending from the day the court issues a bench warrant [for the
arrest of the defendant] to the day the defendant subsequently
appears in the court" in cases where the defendant was absent or
unavailable and had previously been released on bail or on his own
recognizance." 0 The 1984 amendment was intended to "correct
[the] problem created by the Court of Appeal's decision in People
v. Sturgis""' by eliminating the requirement that delays result
directly from the absence or unavailability of the defendant."' In
practice, however, the 1984 amendment succeeded in throwing the
provisions of CPL § 30.30(4)(c,) into still further confusion.
The 1984 amendment "spawned much controversy and the lower
The central issue
courts [were] split as to its import.""' 3
108 Id.
'09 Governor's Bill Jacket for ch. 670, 1984 N.Y. Laws.
110Ch. 670, § 1, 1984 N.Y. Laws 1995.
..
'Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 670 of the Laws of 1984,
reprintedin 1984 N.Y. Laws 3628-29.
"2 But see People v. Gelfand, 131 Misc. 2d 268, 499 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Sup.

Ct. Kings County 1986), a post-1984 decision which maintained that "[tihe
focus [in a CGRiM. PROC. LAW § 30.30(4)(c) analysis] must be on the conduct
of the prosecutor, who "should not be permitted to seize upon the
circumstance of the defendant's unavailability as causation for a delay which in
fact 'resulted from' its own inefficiency." Id. at 273, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 578
(citation omitted).
"3 People v. Garrett, 146 Misc. 2d 919, 922, 553 N.Y.S.2d 948, 949 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1990); rev'd on other grounds, 171 A.D.2d 153, 575
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surrounding judicial interpretations of the 1984 amendments
concerned whether the prosecution was required to exercise due
diligence in locating defendants against whom bench warrants had
been issued but who were not actively attempting to avoid
prosecution. The majority view held that there was no separate
exclusion for defendants against whom bench warrants had been
issued, and that prosecutors were still required "to demonstrate the
absence or unavailability of a defendant who has bench warranted
in order for the time period to be excluded."114 Moreover, "the
mere issuing of a warrant is insufficient to satisfy the People's
obligation to exercise due diligence in their effort to locate the
defendant."115 A number of trial and intermediate appellate courts,
however, held that prosecutors had no further obligation to search
for a defendant once a bench warrant had been issued for his
6
arrest.I1
In 1993, the Court of Appeals resolved this controversy in favor
of the majority. In People v. Bolden,"7 the court considered the
case of Samuel Bolden, an accused robber who had been released
on his own recognizance subsequent to arraignment and later failed
to appear in court."' Upon his nonappearance, a bench warrant
was issued for his arrest; however, 143 days passed before he was
in fact apprehended and returned to court." 9
On appeal, Bolden contended that the prosecution was chargeable
with the 143-day period between the issuance of the warrant and his
N.Y.S.2d 93 (2d Dep't); lv. denied, 79 N.Y.2d 827, 588 N.E.2d 105, 580
N.Y.S.2d 207 (1991).
114Id. See also People v. Surita, 137 Misc. 2d 794, 520 N.Y.S.2d 1002
(N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Bronx County 1987); People v Gaston, N.Y. L.J., March
22, 1988, at 13 (Sup. Ct. New York County March 22, 1988).
15 People v. Richberg, 125 Misc. 2d 975, 481 N.Y.S.2d 237 (N.Y.C. Crim.
Ct. New York County 1984); see also People v. Woods, 150 Misc. 2d 1070,
572 N.Y.S.2d 279 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Kings County 1991).

See, e.g., People v. Bolden, 174 A.D.2d 111, 578 N.Y.S.2d 914 (2d
Dep't 1992). People v. Walker, 122 A.D.2d 654, 505 N.Y.S.2d 158 (Ist
Dep't 1986) (dicta), People v. Rodriguez, 132 Misc. 2d 1044, 506 N.Y.S.2d
406 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. New York County 1986).
17 81 N.Y.2d 146, 613 N.E.2d 145, 597 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1993).
316

Id.at 148, 613 N.E.2d at 145, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
9Id.

11
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arrest because "during that time, the defendant's location [at a
specified address] was known to the prosecution and defendant's
presence could have been obtained had the prosecution exercised
due diligence."120 The prosecutor did not dispute the defendant's
contentions as to his whereabouts, responding solely by arguing
that, in light of the 1984 amendments, due diligence need not be
2
shown in cases where bench warrants had been issued.' 1
The Court of Appeals ruled that the prosecutor's position was
"inconsistent with basic principles of statutory construction"
because "where the same word or phrase is used in different parts
of a statute, it will be presumed to be used in the same sense
throughout. .... "'22 The Bolden court concluded that applying a
blanket exclusion for bench warrant cases would require concluding
that "'absent' and 'unavailable' mean one thing when the period of
delay in question involves an outstanding bench warrant and
something else when the delay merely 'result[ed] from' the
defendant's absence or unavailability."'2
Furthermore, the Bolden court held that "there was nothing in the
legislative history of the 1984 amendment to suggest that the
Legislature intended not to incorporate the statute's requirement of
prosecutorial 'due diligence' into the amendment's new exclusion
for periods ... that are accompanied by outstanding bench
warrants. " 24 The court held further that the 1984 amendments
were enacted for the narrow purpose of overturning the Sturgis
decision, and that "the specific burden that the amendment was
aimed at reducing was the People's duty to show a causative
relationship between the defendant's absence and their delay, not
their wholly independent duty to show 'due diligence' in locating or
producing the defendant."' 25 Accordingly, the District Attorney
was chargeable with the entire 143-day period between the issuance
of the bench warrant and Bolden's arrest, which, when added to 55
20

1

Id. at 149, 613 N.E.2d at 146, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 271.

121id.

122 Id. at 151, 613 N.E.2d at 147, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
123 Id.

Id.
-5/Id.at 153, 613 N.E.2d at 147, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 272.

124
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other days of unexcused delay, exceeded the prosecution's sixmonth readiness deadline.2

F. The Luperon Decision and the 1996 Anendments

After the Bolden decision, judicial interpretation of the 1984
amendment changed from qualitative to quantitative. Rather than
focusing on whether due diligence was required after bench
warrants were issued, decisions after Bolden centered on the degree

of diligence required in enforcing the warrant. Prior to Bolden, at
least one trial court had urged that "a reasonable period following
the issuance of a bench warrant should be excluded due to the
administrative delays inherent in the processing of a bench
warrant." 27 However, another intermediate court rejected an
exclusion for an administrative delay of six months in enforcing a
bench warrant.'2
The question which remained open was whether the requirement
of due diligence was satisfied "if the police acted diligently some
time during... the period between the bench warrant and the
arrest, "129 or whether law enforcement authorities were required to
126 Id.

at 156, 613 N.E.2d at 150, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
People v. Lewis, 150 Misc. 2d 886, 890, 578 N.Y.S.2d 393, 395
(N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. New York County 1991).
128 People v. Mazyck, 208 A.D.2d 956, 957, 618 N.Y.S.2d 406, 407 (2d
Dep't 1994) (holding that "the deficiency in the warrant squad's efforts during
the six month period after the defendant was indicted, was not cured by their
later efforts"); see also People v. Drummond, 215 A.D.2d 579, 627 N.Y.S.2d
55 (2d Dep't 1995) (denying exclusion for 43-day administrative delay in
enforcing bench warrant). The concept of "reasonable administrative delay"
has also been held to allow the prosecution to exclude the time between the
defendant's indictment and the time he was informed of his arraignment date.
People v. Walton, 136 Misc. 2d 539, 518 N.Y.S.2d 930 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1987) (delay of 41-days in informing defendant of the charges against
him not inconsistent with due diligence in light of administrative procedures in
Queens trial court).
129John D. Powell, New York's Court of Appeals: Vito J.Ttone: Stalwart or
Curmudgeon?, 59 ALB.L. REV. 1803, 1820 (1996).
127

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998

23

Touro Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 [1998], Art. 2

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 15

act to enforce bench warrants immediately upon their issuance.
The Court of Appeals decided the issue in a controversial 1995
decision, People v. Luperon."3° Fernando Luperon, a tenant
accused of wounding his landlord in a shooting incident, was
arraigned on a felony complaint in Kings County on August 2,
1989.'
Subsequently, he failed to appear in court and a bench
warrant was issued for his arrest.132 He was arrested on unrelated
charges on October 16, 1989, at which time the existence of the
outstanding bench warrant was discovered; however, as the grand
jury had not yet returned an indictment on the August 2 felony
33
complaint, he was again released on his own recognizance.
Slightly less than two months later, Luperon was indicted, but no
arraignment was scheduled and no notice was sent to him or his
attorney. 33
An ex-parte order was issued for his arrest on
December 19, 1989, but he was not in fact arrested until October
35
1990, almost a year later.
On appeal, Luperon argued that the prosecutor was "inexcusably
unready" for a total of 482 days, including the 290-day period
between the issuance of the ex-parte order and his subsequent
arrest. 36 The circumstances of the case were not without mitigating
factors for the defendant. Although he had failed to appear in court
on an earlier occasion, he had never been notified of his indictment
or of a scheduled arraignment date.'
Thus, Luperon was not
deliberately avoiding prosecution during the period after his arrest
and release on October 16, 1989, and the prosecution was required
to exercise due diligence in locating him.
The Luperon case ultimately turned on the 69-day period between
December 19, 1989 and February 26, 1990. During this period, no
action was taken to enforce the December 19 warrant due to
administrative delays in assigning it to a member of the warrant
130
85 N.Y.2d 71, 647 N.E.2d 1243, 623 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1995).
13"Id. at 74, 647 N.E.2d at 1244, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
132id.

133Id. at 75, 647 N.E.2d at 1245, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 737.

134/id.
135Id.
136
Id.

137
Id.at 77, 647 N.E.2d at 1246, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
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squad.13 ' The police officer who was ultimately assigned the
responsibility of enforcing the warrant made repeated efforts to
execute it, including inquiries at the defendant's known addresses,
searches of public records and inquiries of the defendant's ex-wife
and former landlady. 39
The trial court and the intermediate appellate court ruled that the
prosecution had demonstrated sufficient due diligence despite the
initial two-month delay in enforcing the warrant.'4 The Court of
Appeals, however, reversed, holding that the adoption of a blanket
exception for reasonable administrative delay "is inappropriate,
since the 'due diligence' standard that is mandated by the statute is
flexible enough to permit consideration of processing demands
where warranted by the demonstrated facts."141
Because the
prosecution had not alleged any specific facts to show that they
acted diligently in processing the warrant during the period at issue,
the court declined to exclude that time, noting that "this court is not
privileged to defer to law enforcement's resource-allocation
choices; rather it is duty-bound to determine whether the law
enforcement arm of government has acted in compliance with CPL
§ 30.30's 'due diligence' command."' 4 2 When added to the other
periods of unexcused delay, this 69-day period brought the total
time chargeable to the prosecution to more than 43six months,
necessitating dismissal of the charges against Luperon.
The Luperon decision caused great consternation among the
Legislature as well as the law enforcement community. As Judge
Bellacosa noted in his dissent, it was feared that "the practical
consequence of this new rule is a command to... henceforth keep
pursuing and rearresting hosts of defendants... no matter how
many times courts set them free pending trial.""" Judge Bellacosa
argued that the due diligence requirement was not intended "to be
138 Id. at 76, 647 N.E.2d at 1246, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
139 Id.
141

Id. at 76-77, 647 N.E.2d at 1246, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
Id. at 79, 647 N.E.2d at 1249, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 741.

142

Id.

'40

143 Id. at

84, 647 N.E.2d at 1250, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
Id. at 89, 647 N.E.2d at 1254, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 746 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
'4

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998

25

Touro Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 [1998], Art. 2

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 15

wielded as a sword by defendants who were granted the benefit of
pretrial release, only to have them turn around and evade trial long

enough to assert that their evasion morphs into dismissal of the
criminal charges." 45 Noting the benefits to Luperon - a defendant
whose guilt was not in doubt, and who had disappeared on two
separate occasions during the pendency of the charges against him the dissent argued that the application of a strict due diligence rule

to bench warrants was nothing more than an incentive to defendants
to "stonewall and lay low for however long
it takes to secure
6
improbable dismissals for their effrontery." ,1

Accordingly, the Legislature amended CPL § 30.30(4)(c) for the
second time in October 1996.147 The 1996 amendment separated
CPL § 30.30(4)(c) into two paragraphs, creating a definition of

"absence" and "unavailability" for bench warrant cases separate

from the paragraph dealing with due diligence.'4 As of October 4,
1996, there is no statutory requirement that prosecutors exercise
due diligence in enforcing a bench warrant against a defendant who
has previously escaped from custody or been released on bail or on
his own recognizance. 4 9
141 Id. at 92, 647 N.E. at 1255, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 747 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
146 Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
Judge Bellacosa argued that trial judges,
especially in jurisdictions with large judicial and law-enforcement backlogs,
would have to resort to trying defendants in absentia or remanding defendants
routinely to pretrial custody in order to avoid widespread dismissals for failure
to diligently enforce bench warrants. Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting); see also
People v. Richberg, 125 Misc. 2d 975, 983-84, 481 N.Y.S.2d 237 (N.Y.C.
Crim. Ct. New York County 1984) (stating that "[ujnder the current legislative
scheme, a defendant clearly benefits from absenting himself from the court"
and calling for legislative action to remove the due diligence requirement in
cases where the defendant fails to attend a court appearance).
147Ch. 631, § 1, 1996 N.Y Laws.

id.

148

149 N.Y.

CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30(4)(c)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1996). It is
noteworthy that at least one bill introduced in the Assembly in response to the
Luperon decision created a blanket exception in bench warrant cases whether
or not the defendant had previously escaped from custody or been released on
bail. 1995 N.Y.A.B. 8387, § 2 (Jan. 24, 1996). Had this bill passed the
Legislature, prosecutors would have been able to escape their obligation of due
diligence even against defendants who had never been arrested or informed of
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The older standard established by Bolden and Luperon, however,
is of considerably more than historical interest, as the 1996
amendment is not retroactive.' 50 Thus, the requirement of due
diligence in bench warrant cases will exist in the New York judicial
system for years to come.'
HI.

WHO IS A FUGITIVE:
UNDER CPL § 30.30(4)(c)

DEFINING ABSENCE

A. Avoidance of Prosecution
Despite the controversies and legislative amendments described
above, the basic issues surrounding an analysis under CPL
§ 30.30(4)(c) have remained the same throughout the history of the
statute. When confronted with an application for dismissal in a
case where the defendant's location was unknown to the
prosecution, a court must first determine whether the period of the
defendant's absence is excludable because the defendant was
actively avoiding prosecution or had failed to appear in court
pursuant to a bench warrant. If none of these statutory exemptions
apply, the court must then determine whether the prosecution
exercised due diligence to locate the defendant.
In addition, the prosecutor has the obligation of alleging that one
of these statutory conditions has been met. The defendant's initial
obligation in sustaining a motion under CPL § 30.30 is satisfied
simply by alleging that the required period has elapsed and the
prosecution is not yet ready for trial.' The burden "then shifts to
the People to identify the exclusions on which they intend to
the charges against them through the simple expedient of obtaining a bench
warrant.
150 Ch. 631, § 2, 1996 N.Y. Laws 1327.
15 See, e.g., People v. Sigismundi, 89 N.Y.2d 587, 588, 679 N.E.2d 620,
621, 657 N.Y.S.2d 381, 382 (1997) (addressing a question of first impression
under "the former version of CPL § 30.30.").
"52 People v. Luperon, 85 N.Y.2d 71, 76, 647 N.E.2d 1243, 1247, 623
N.Y.S.2d 735, 739 (1995); see also People v. Cortes, 80 N.Y.2d 201, 604
N.E.2d 71, 590 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1992); People v. Drummond, 215 A.D.2d 579,
627 N.Y.S.2d 55 (2d Dep't 1995).
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rely . . . . "' Thus, where the district attorney does not argue that
the defendant was avoiding prosecution or that the prosecution
exercised due diligence in locating him, dismissal may result even if

the facts of the case would otherwise have entitled the prosecutor to
an exclusion.' 54
The great majority of New York court decisions have held that

prosecutors are under no obligation to exercise due diligence in
locating defendants who are actively avoiding prosecution.155 Mere
allegation that the defendant is absent, however, is not enough to
satisfy the prosecutor's obligation. 56 A defendant cannot be

considered to have been actively avoiding prosecution without

"clear indication that the defendant is knowingly seeking to avoid
return to court." 5 7 The determination of whether a defendant is

knowingly avoiding return to court is a factual one to be applied on
a case-by-case basis, with no single factor carrying overwhelming
weight.

New York courts have applied a variety of factors in determining
whether a defendant is seeking to avoid prosecution. These include
fleeing the jurisdiction after arraignment, which has been held to be
'53 Drummond, 215 A.D.2d at 579, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 57.
' See, e.g., People v.Biaz, 222 A.D.2d 324, 325, 635 N.Y.S.2d 616, 617
(Ist Dep't 1995) (dismissing indictment where "despite indications that
defendant used several aliases and was returned to this jurisdiction from Puerto
Rico, the record is devoid of any opposition to defendant's motion.").
' People v. Torres, 88 N.Y.2d 928, 931, 669 N.E.2d 1112, 1113, 646
N.Y.S.2d 790, 790 (1996); Luperon, 85 N.Y.2d at 80 n.3, 647 N.E.2d at
1250 n.3, 623 N.Y.S.2d 742 n.3; but see People v. Lesley, 232 A.D.2d 259,
649 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1st Dep't 1996) (dismissing an indictment where a bench
warrant had been issued, the defendant had fled the jurisdiction, and was
incarcerated in Maryland under an alias, but where "the information at hand
[to the New York State police] was obviously sufficient to identify this
defendant despite his use of aliases."); see also notes 185-93 infra and
accompanying text (discussing the obligation of due diligence as it relates to
incarcerated defendants).
156 People v. Peterson, 115 A.D.2d 497, 498, 496 N.Y.S.2d 231, 232 (2d
Dep't 1985).
189 A.D.2d 717, 592 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1st Dep't
'" People v. Delacruz,
1993); People v. Brazeau, 162 A.D.2d 979, 980, 557 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1st Dep't
1989), lv. denied, 76 N.Y.2d 891, 562 N.E.2d 878, 561 N.Y.S.2d 553
(1990).
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competent evidence that the defendant intended to avoid return to
court."5 8 In fact, a defendant who leaves the jurisdiction of the trial

court - or even one who remains in the jurisdiction but simply fails
to appear incourt on an adjourned date - is generally presumed to
have been avoiding prosecution unless he can rebut that
presumption by stating a valid reason for his actions. 5 9
Other factors commonly considered in determining whether a
defendant is knowingly seeking to avoid return to court include use
of aliases," 6t use of false identifying information such as addresses,
dates of birth and identifying numbers,' failure to report to parole
" See, e.g., People v. Delacruz, 189 A.D.2d 717, 592 N.Y.S.2d 732;
People v. Chisolm, 232 A.D.2d 264, 649 N.Y.S.2d 127, (1st Dep't 1986)
(fleeing the jurisdiction is competent evidence of avoidance of prosecution);
People v. Jackson, 150 A.D.2d 609, 610, 541 N.Y.S.2d 478, 479 (2d Dep't
1989) (failing to attend a scheduled court appearance "strongly suggests an
attempt to avoid prosecution.").
'59 See. e.g., People v. Patterson, 38 N.Y.2d 623, 345 N.E.2d
330, 381
N.Y.S.2d 858 (1976) ([D]efendant who failed to appear in court on adjourned
date, continued to work openly in the jurisdiction and live openly at his former
address, and "simply waited for the police to come and get him," was avoiding
prosecution); People v. Cohen, 66 A.D.2d 901, 411 N.Y.S.2d 411 (2d Dep't
1978) (when defendant failed to report for narcotics rehabilitation and failed to
appear for sentencing on an unrelated conviction, "[the] inference is
inescapable that, in the intervening period, defendant was attempting to avoid
apprehension."); People v. Yanez, 128 Misc. 2d 716, 717-19, 490 N.Y.S.2d
971, 972 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1985) (where defendant who jumped
bail following arraignment, moved to New Jersey and resumed an open
lifestyle was avoiding prosecution). But see People v. Delaronde, 201 A.D.2d
846, 846-47, 608 N.Y.S.2d 339 (3d Dep't 1994) (prosecutor was required to
exercise due diligence in locating defendant who lived in Canada where there
was "no proof that defendant was attempting to avoid apprehension.").
110
People v. Rodriguez, 180 A.D.2d 517, 518, 580 N.Y.S.2d 24, 25 (1st
Dep't 1992) (multiple aliases over seven-year absence); People v. Jackson, 142
A.D.2d 597, 598, 530 N.Y.S.2d 40, (2d Dep't 1988) (use of brother's name
and pedigree information); People v. Gamez, 241 A.D.2d 693, 660 N.Y.S.2d
196 (3d Dep't 1997) (multiple aliases over eleven-year period); People v.
Green, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 26, 1996, at 25 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County March 26,
1996) (several aliases).
161 People v. Rivera, 106 A.D.2d 278, 279, 482 N.Y.S.2d 488, 489
(Ist
Dep't 1984) (defendant used 14 names, 6 dates of birth, 5 different Social
Security numbers, and 12 different addresses); People v. Washington, 233
A.D.2d 684, 650 N.Y.S.2d 334 (3d Dep't 1996) (defendant was arrested
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or probation officers, 62 the defendant's former criminal history, 63
the seriousness of the offense"6 and the defendant's admission that
he was intentionally avoiding prosecution.' 65 At least one court,
however, has held that use of an alias without more is not sufficient
to demonstrate that a defendant was intentionally avoiding

prosecution, especially where he had never been notified of the
charges at issue.

66

Indeed, the question of whether a defendant was aware that he
was being sought for prosecution is central to determining whether
he was actively avoiding apprehension.' 67 Logic dictates that it is
much less likely for a defendant to knowingly seek to avoid return
to court if he has never been to court in the first place.

Thus, a

several times within New York State on unrelated charges and gave a number
of aliases and false dates of birth).
162 People v. Neal, 160 Misc. 2d 173, 180-81, 607 N.Y.S.2d 866, 871 (Sup.
Ct. New York County 1994).
163 Green, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 26, 1996 at 25 (defendant's prior criminal history
and his use of aliases on prior occasions weigh in favor of determination that
he avoided prosecution).
'6 Whaley v. Rodriguez, 840 F.2d 1046, 1048 (2d Cir. 1988).
[I]n determining whether Whaley had delayed the trial by
attempting to avoid prosecution, some consideration should
be given to the nature and strength of the charges against
him. One who knows that, if caught, he surely will be
convicted of a serious felony is more likely to attempt to
avoid apprehension than one who stands only an outside
chance of being found guilty of a minor misdemeanor.
Id.
65 People v. Walker, 133 A.D.2d 2, 518 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1st Dep't 1987)
(defendant admitted that he was continuously attempting to avoid execution of
parole violation warrant and by inference prosecution upon the charges at
issue); People v. Johnston, I 11 A.D.2d 262, 263, 489 N.Y.S.2d 99 (2d Dep't
1985) (defendant boasted upon arrest that "[i]t took six years for them to catch
me.").
"6 People v. Davis, 205 A.D.2d 697, 613 N.Y.S.2d 668 (2d Dep't 1994)
(prosecution was obligated to exercise due diligence in locating a defendant
arrested under an alias.); see also People v. Garrett, 146 Misc. 2d 919, 928,
553 N.Y.S.2d 948, 953 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1990) (defendant used two
aliases but the record was unclear as to whether he had been notified of the
charges against him).
67 People v. Mazyck, 208 A.D.2d 956, 618 N.Y.S.2d 406 (2d Dep't 1994).
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defendant who is never in court, never arrested or charged and
unaware that he had been indicted cannot be found to have been
avoiding prosecution.' 6' Similarly, a defendant who was told that
he would be notified of a future court date but was never in fact
notified was not avoiding prosecution.' 6 9 A defendant who
absconds at a late stage of the prosecution - in one case, on the eve
of trial - carries a much greater presumption that his failure to
appear is due to deliberate avoidance of prosecution!" Conversely,
however, a defendant who learned of a bench warrant and
attempted to answer it but was thwarted by administrative errors in
the judicial system was held not to be avoiding prosecution, and the
7
prosecutor was not entitled to exclude the resulting delay.1 '
B. ProsecutorialDue Diligence
If the defendant is not deliberately avoiding prosecution and no
bench warrant has been issued against him or if his location is
known to the prosecutor, then the prosecution is required to
demonstrate due diligence in attempting to bring him to trial. Due
diligence has been defined as "[s]uch a measure of prudence,
activity or assiduity, as is properly to be expected from, and
ordinarily exercised by, a reasonable and prudent man under the
particular circumstances; not measured by any absolute standard,
but depending on the relative facts of the special case. " 'm In the
context of attempting to locate a defendant whose present
whereabouts are unknown, "[tihe test as to what constitutes due
'r3 People v. Peterson, 115 A.D.2d 497, 496 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1st Dep't
1985); People v. Brooks, 149 Misc. 2d 955, 565 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1990).
'" People v. Drummond, 215 A.D.2d 579, 627 N.Y.S.2d 55 (2d Dep't
1995).
70 People v. Cropper, 202 A.D.2d 603, 609 N.Y.S.2d 288 (2d Dep't 1994)
(defendant who failed to appear on his scheduled trial date, without more, was
held to have been avoiding prosecution, and the People were thus entitled to
exclude an 1 1-year delay).
171 Brooks, 149 Misc. 2d at 958-61, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 958-60.
" People v. Chi Keung Seto, 162 Misc. 2d 255, 260, 616 N.Y.S.2d 890,
894 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1994), quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
457 (6th ed. 1990).
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diligence seems to be based upon a determination of whether law

enforcement acted in a reasonable and expeditious manner to locate
the defendant based on the information readily ascertainable to
it. ,,173

In any event, "minimal attempts to locate a defendant and secure
his presence in court will not satisfy the due diligence standard. "174

Thus, failure to pursue an obvious lead, such as searching for a
defendant at a known address, will not satisfy the obligation of due
diligence. 75 In order to satisfy the requirement of due diligence,

the district attorney must at least "expend the minimal effort of
checking the defendant's last known address, in the absence of any
information that he was not there, e.g. that he fled the

jurisdiction."'

76

The generally accepted standard for the exercise of due diligence

requires that the prosecution "must exhaust all reasonable leads as
to the defendant's whereabouts." 177 However, the prosecution is
not required to search indefinitely for a defendant after all
reasonable investigative leads have been exhausted; thus, a search
during which the police "exhausted their last investigative lead" and
then put out a bulletin to other law enforcement agencies requesting
Id.; see also People v. Denton, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 10, 1992 at 25 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County Sept. 10, 1992).
'"
People v. Marrin, 187 A.D.2d 284, 286, 589 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876 (1st
Dep't 1992); People v. Quiles, 176 A.D.2d 164, 165, 574 N.Y.S.2d 188, 189
(1st Dep't 1991).
7 Quiles, 176 A.D.2d at 165, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
176 People v. Davis, 205 A.D.2d 697, 700-01, 613 N.Y.S.2d 668, 671 (2d
Dep't 1991); see also People v. Orse, 118 A.D.2d 816, 817-18, 500 N.Y.S.2d
173, 174 (2d Dep't 1986) (mailing of two letters, a year apart, to defendant's
last known address insufficient where no other efforts made to locate
defendant); People v. Franks, 134 A.D.2d 888, 889, 521 N.Y.S.2d 605, 606
(4th Dep't 1987) (police did not satisfy due diligence requirements where they
did not check government records and failed to make inquiries of California or
West Virginia authorities despite having information that defendant might be in
those states.); People v. Peterson, 115 A.D.2d 497, 498, 496 N.Y.S.2d 231,
232 (2d Dep't 1985) (finding due diligence standard not satisfied where police
did not check known addresses of relatives and failed to check government
records).
" People v. Duncan, 230 A.D.2d 750, 649 N.Y.S.2d 362 (2d Dep't 1996);
People v. Delaronde, 201 A.D.2d 846, 608 N.Y.S.2d 338 (3d Dep't 1994).
'7
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information as to the defendant's whereabouts was held sufficient to
satisfy the due diligence requirement. 7
In general, the obligation of due diligence is satisfied by the use
of common-sense measures such as conducting a search of public
records, visiting a defendant's known addresses or haunts and
contacting the defendant's associates or relatives. Thus, a detective
who visited the defendant's last known address, contacted the
defendant's mother and visited an alternate address given by the
defendant at the time of his arrest was held to have satisfied the
prosecution's obligation of due diligence. 179 Similarly, the due
diligence requirement was satisfied when a warrant squad visited
the defendant's last known addresses, contacted family members
and searched the records of the New York State Department of
Motor Vehicles and the Human Resources Administration.
Other
Manin, 187 A.D.2d at 285, 589 N.Y.S. 2d 874 at 875 (1st Dep't 1992).
People v. Providence, 216 A.D.2d 75, 628 N.Y.S.2d 64 (lst Dep't
1995).
"mPeople v. Maldonado, 210 A.D.2d 259, 260, 619 N.Y.S.2d 730, 731 (2d
Dep't 1994); see also Whaley v. Rodriguez, 840 F.2d 1046, 1049-53 (2d Cir.
1988) (finding visits to mother and girlfriend, inquiries at place of
employment, filing of information with National Crime Information Center,
and contacts with South Carolina and Georgia authorities sufficient to fulfill
prosecutorial duty); People v. Hudson, 167 A.D.2d 950, 561 N.Y.S.2d 1014
(4th Dep't 1990) (holding that due diligence obligation satisfied when police
checked defendant's place of employment and interviewed defendant's sisters
and their boyfriends); People v. Complete Allah, 202 A.D.2d 599, 609
N.Y.S.2d 628 (2d Dep't 1994) (holding contact with relatives, visit to
homeless shelter, and surveillance of areas known to be frequented by
homeless people sufficient due diligence in locating homeless defendant);
People v. Cruz, 155 A.D.2d 683, 548 N.Y.S.2d 60 (2d Dep't 1989) (holding
that check of last known address, visits to possible places of employment, and
checks of government records under false name known to police was
sufficient); People v. Lugo, 140 A.D.2d 715, 715-16, 528 N.Y.S.2d 895, 896
(2d Dep't 1988) (holding that three visits to last known address, inquiries of
relatives, and circulation of "wanted" posters sufficient); People v.
Hutchenson, 136 A.D.2d 737, 738, 524 N.Y.S.2d 76, 77-78 (2d Dep't 1988)
(holding that four visits to last known address, visits to relatives and former
places of employment, surveillance of known haunts and checks of government
records "clearly" sufficient); People v. Macklowe, 131 A.D.2d 785, 786, 517
N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (2d Dep't 1987) (visiting last known address, interviews of
local merchants and defendant's father sufficient); People v. Walters, 127
'7

'7
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measures which seem reasonable in light of the information

available to law enforcement - such as notifying customs and border
patrol authorities of a defendant believed to be residing in Canada have also been held to constitute a diligent search.'' Accordingly,
the due diligence obligation is not an oppressive one. However, the

search for a missing defendant must be conducted with dispatch, as
a deficiency in prompt investigation cannot be cured by later

exercise of due diligence by law enforcement authorities. 2
Once the prosecution has announced its readiness for trial, their
obligation under CPL § 30.30 to exercise due diligence in locating
the defendant ceases. CPL § 30.30 is not, strictly speaking, a
speedy trial statute; rather, it is a prosecutorial readiness rule. 83
Accordingly, "[o]nce the People have announced their readiness for
trial, there is no requirement that they exercise due diligence to
locate the defendant when he has voluntarily absented himself from
the proceedings, since the People did not contribute to the delays..
.

.,,1s4

Even after the prosecution declares its readiness for trial,

A.D. 2d 870, 511 N.Y.S.2d 957 (2d Dep't 1987) (canvassing of last known
address and inquiries to building superintendent and defendant's mother
sufficient); People v. Taylor, 127 A.D.2d 714, 714-15, 511 N.Y.S.2d 692,
692-693 (2d Dep't 1987) (visiting three most recent addresses, inquiries to
neighbors, and checks of telephone company and government records
sufficient); People v. Genkin, 131 A.D.2d 505, 506, 516 N.Y.S.2d 115, 116
(2d Dep't 1987) (inquires of associate of defendant, government and utility
records, Israeli consulate and Canadian authorities sufficient); People v.
Jackson, 150 A.D.2d 609, 610, 541 N.Y.S.2d 478, 479 (2d Dep't 1989)
(visiting last known address, visits to mother and girlfriend, inquiries of parole
officer, and checks of government and utility records sufficient).
"' People v. Delaronde, 201 A.D.2d 846, 847, 608 N.Y.S.2d 338, 339 (3d
Dep't 1994) (State police officer assigned to enforce warrant placed
defendant's name in the United States Customs computer, released defendant's
photograph to customs and border patrol officials, and notified Canadian
authorities as well as searching public records and defendant's known haunts in
New York State).
"sPeople v. Mazyck, 208 A.D.2d 956, 957, 618 N.Y.S.2d 406, 407 (2d
Dep't 1994).
183 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30 (McKinney 1992).
'" People v. Cephas, 207 A.D.2d 903, 904, 616 N.Y.S.2d 668, 668 (2d
Dep't 1994); see also People v. Coplin, 236 A.D. 2d 552, 554, 654 N.Y.S.2d
150, 152 (2d Dep't 1997); People v. Biaz, 222 A.D.2d 324, 325, 635
N.Y.S.2d 616, 617 (1st Dep't 1995); People v. Williams, 229 A.D. 2d 603,
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however, the defendant may still claim that his constitutional right
to speedy trial has been violated - a separate claim which must be
adjudicated under the standards set forth in CPL § 30.20 and by the
Court of Appeals' decision in People v. Taranovich."'
i. IncarceratedDefendants
The obligation of due diligence in locating a defendant
incarcerated on another charge involves special constitutional
implications. In Smith v. Hooey,' 6 the United States Supreme
Court recognized a constitutional obligation on prosecutors to
secure the presence for trial of defendants incarcerated in other
jurisdictions. "7 As an incarcerated defendant is incapable of
appearing for trial on his own volition, prosecutors are obliged to
take all reasonable measures to obtain his presence from the
incarcerating authority.'&
Accordingly, New York courts have often held prosecutors to a
considerably stricter standard of due diligence in obtaining
incarcerated defendants than would normally be their obligation.' 89
For example, in People v. Lesley,190 the First Department declined
to exclude a 194-day delay resulting from the defendant's
incarceration in Maryland under a false name.' 9' Even though the
defendant used an alias, the Lesley court held that the information in
possession of the Maryland authorities was sufficient to identify him
to the New York prosecutors.'9 Similarly, in People v. Jensen,'19
646 N.Y.S.2d 142 (2d Dep't 1996); People v. Cropper, 202 A.D.2d 603, 605,
609 N.Y.S.2d 288, 290 (2d Dep't 1994).
'85 37 N.Y.2d 442, 335 N.E.2d 161, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1975).
See also
supra note 78 (discussing the Taranovich test).
6 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
1'87 Id. at 383.
188 Id.

"9 See, e.g., People v. Davis, 184 A.D.2d 575, 577, 584 N.Y.S.2d 638,
640 (2d Dep't 1992) (knowledge of whereabouts of defendant incarcerated in

New York imputed to prosecutors even in absence of actual knowledge of
defendant's location).
'90 232 A.D. 2d 259, 649 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1st Dep't 1996).
191 Id.
1- Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998

35

Touro Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 [1998], Art. 2

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 15

a Suffolk County trial court held that the prosecution was obligated
to extradite the defendant, who was incarcerated in Florida, even
though he only faced misdemeanor charges in New York State.'94
In a recent decision, however, the New York Court of Appeals
ruled that prosecutors may exclude delays resulting from the
absence of an incarcerated defendant if his actions during
incarceration indicate that he was actively attempting to avoid
prosecution. 9 5
ii. Defendants Residing in Other Jurisdictions
At common law in England, a defendant who absented himself
from the jurisdiction was a fugitive and liable to be convicted in
absentia through the process of outlawry.'96 Although this practice
has fallen into disuse, a defendant who leaves the jurisdiction after
the commencement of a criminal action carries a strong
presumption that he has done so in a deliberate effort to avoid
prosecution.' 97 New York courts have applied this presumption on
certain occasions even to defendants who resume an open lifestyle
after leaving the state.' 98
The legal position of a defendant who leaves the jurisdiction
before charges are filed, or who is unaware of the charges against
him at the time he removes himself from the jurisdiction, is more
ambiguous. Similarly, a defendant who resides outside New York,
but commits a crime within the state, cannot be regarded as a
fugitive merely because of his return to his normal place of

109 Misc. 2d 813, 441 N.Y.S. 2d 333 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1981).
'94 Id. at 814, 441 N.Y.S. 2d at 442.
"9People v. Sigismundi, 89 N.Y.2d 587, 591-93, 679 N.E.2d 620, 622, 657
'9'

N.Y.S.2d 381, 382 (1997) (declining to establish a general rule under which
knowledge of an incarcerated defendant's whereabouts is always imputed to
the prosecutor, and holding that use of multiple aliases and false pedigree
information established that the defendant was avoiding prosecution).

19 See Green, supra note 25, at 453.
'97 See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.

People v. Morton, 22 N.Y.2d 674, 238 N.E.2d 755 (1968); People v.
Yanez, 128 Misc. 2d 716, 717-19, 490 N.Y.S. 2d 971, 973 (Sup. Ct. New
198

York County 1985).
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residence after the commission of the offense.'" In such cases,
courts have generally held that the prosecutor is required to exercise
due diligence in locating the defendant even outside New York
State. For example, in People v. Schiavo,w a Westchester County
trial court dismissed an indictment against a defendant who was
unaware of the charges against him and was living openly in
Arizona under circumstances wherein law enforcement authorities
could have located him with the exercise of due diligence."' In
addition, the Fourth Department in People v. Franks" held that the

obligation of due diligence required the prosecutor to make
inquiries of authorities in California where the defendant was
believed to be in that state.20 3

In cases where the defendant resides outside New York,
however, the obligation of due diligence has been interpreted not to
require New York authorities to exceed their jurisdiction. For

example, a state police officer enforcing a bench warrant was not
required to interview relatives of the defendant living in an Indian

reservation which state police were not permitted to enter.'
In
light of the "constraint" against the officer's authority, this conduct
was held not to violate the officer's obligation to follow every
reasonable investigative lead. 205

9 See People v. Delaronde, 201 A.D.2d 846, 847, 608 N.Y.S. 2d 338 (3d
Dep't 1994). The defendant maintained addresses both in Canada and on an
Indian reservation beyond the jurisdiction of the New York State police. Id.
200 118 Misc. 2d 776, 461 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Westchester County Ct. 1983).
201 Id. at 778-79, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 691. The police knew the forwarding
address and telephone number in Arizona through which the defendant could
have been located. Id.
202 134 A.D.2d 888, 521 N.Y.S.2d 605 (1987).
203 Id. at 889, 521 N.Y.S.2d 605; see also People v. Wiggins, 194 A.D.2d
840, 840-42, 603 N.Y.S.2d 81, 81-83 (3d Dep't 1993) (failure to extradite
defendant in a timely manner after his arrest in Oklahoma violates obligation
of20due
diligence).
4 Delaronde,
201 A.D.2d. at 848, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
20iId.
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iii IncapacitatedDefendants
On at least one occasion, law enforcement officers were held not
to have violated their obligation of due diligence even when they
failed to arrest a defendant who was under their control. In People
v. Chi Keung Seto, 2° a New York trial court considered the case of
a defendant who failed to appear on charges of kidnapping, assault
and possession of a weapon.2° Subsequent to his failure to appear,
the defendant was shot and severely wounded.2 °8 While comatose
in the hospital, the defendant was guarded by police officers for his
own safety. t 9
Ultimately, the police officers guarding the
defendant learned his name, but failed to inquire into his criminal
record.210 Even though the defendant was under the control of
police officers and his name was known to them, the trial court
declined to dismiss the indictment against him, stating that "there
was no reason for the police to treat this unknown Asian male, an
alleged victim of an assault, as a suspect or a perpetrator or a
possible defendant with an open warrant." 2 1 1
Under the
circumstances, even physical control of the defendant was not a
"reasonably known lead" which law enforcement authorities could
2 12
have been expected to follow.
iv. Traffic Offenses and Appearance Tickets
The right to speedy trial does not attach to actions commenced
for traffic violations. 1 3 However, even for those traffic offenses
classified as misdemeanors, the prosecution is not obligated to
162 Misc. 2d 255, 616 N.Y.S. 2d 890 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1994).
206

207Id.
208 Id.

at 256, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 890-91.
at 258, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 890-91.

'09/d.

at 259, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 892-93.

210

Id.
212 Id. at 261, 616 N.Y.S.2d
at 894.
212/Id.

at 262, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
213 People v. Solomon, 124 Misc. 2d 33, 475 N.Y.S.2d 749 (Dist. Ct.
Nassau County 1984); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00 (McKinney 1998);
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 155 (McKinney 1996).
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conduct a search for an absent defendant who has been issued a
simplified traffic information in lieu of arrest."1 4 In the only
decision to address this question, the Nassau County District Court
held that due diligence in traffic cases "would not require the
prosecutor to actively seek out and secure the presence of the
defendant in court."" 5 Such a requirement "would result in an
impossible burden on the prosecutor in terms of the sheer volume
of traffic cases" and would be inappropriate in light of the nature of
the offense.21 6 Accordingly, a defendant who has been issued a
simplified traffic information will be considered unavailable for trial
during the entire period during which he fails to respond to the
appearance ticket issued to him.2" 7 In fact, the provisions of CPL
§ 30.30(4)(c) do not apply to any criminal action which is
commenced with the issuance of an appearance ticket. 2t8 This
exception, which was created by a 1982 amendment to the Criminal
Procedure Law, 9 overturned prior court decisions which held that
there was no blanket exclusion for desk appearance tickets charging
crimes under the Penal Law. °

214

Solomon, 124 Misc. 2d at 36, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 752.

215/d.

216

Id.

2 17

Id.

211

People v. Parris, 79 N.Y.2d 69, 588 N.E.2d 65, 580 N.Y.S.2d 167

(1990). Criminal prosecutions which are initiated via appearance tickets fall
under the related provisions of CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 30.30(5)(b), which
provides that the deadline for prosecutorial readiness does not begin to run
until the defendant appears in court to answer the summons. Id.
219

220

Id.
See People v. Colon, 59 N.Y.2d 921, 453 N.E.2d 548, 466 N.Y.S.2d

319 (1983) (prosecution was not ready where they had failed to convert desk
appearance tickets into jurisdictionally sufficient informations).
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OPEN
PURSUING THE ABSENT SOLUTION:
THE CPL § 30.30(4)(c)
QUESTIONS
ABOUT
EXCLUSION

A. The Constitutionalityof CPL § 30.30(4)(c) After Rayborn v.
Scully
Even after two legislative amendments, open questions remain in
In
the interpretation and enforcement of CPL § 30.30(4)(c).
perhaps the most profound of these, the efforts of the New York
State Legislature to narrow the obligation of due diligence in
locating missing defendants may run up against a countervailing
In a number of recent
trend in speedy trial jurisprudence.
decisions, the Second Circuit has recognized a prosecutorial
obligation to conduct a diligent search even for defendants who are
in hiding or deliberately avoiding prosecution.
The question of the extent of the prosecutorial due diligence
obligation was first opened in the Second Circuit in United States v.
Salzmann,"' which concerned an alleged draft evader who had
moved to Israel prior to receiving his induction notice from a New
York local draft board."22 Although he informed the draft board
that he did not have the financial resources to report for induction
in the United States, he was nevertheless ordered to report for
induction in New York on January 18, 1971.223 Following his
failure to report, the draft board referred his case to the United
States Attorney for prosecution, and he was subsequently
indicted.224 The United States never attempted to obtain his
extradition from Israel, and the case languished until 1975 when
Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York
appointed Professor Louis Lusky of Columbia University to
2
represent him.
417 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
Id. at 1143-44.
213 Id. at 1144.
224
1d. at 1145.
225 id.
221

222

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss1/2

40

Abramovsky and Edelstein: Prosecutorial Readiness

1998

PROSECUTORIAL READINESS

The defendant, Sidney Salzmann, was "unavailable" rather than
"absent" according to the classification outlined in CPL
§ 30.30(4)(c).
His location was known to american law
enforcement authorities, with whom he remained in
communication.'
Furthermore, he was not attempting to avoid
prosecution or even to avoid military service. He had moved to
Israel considerably prior to receiving his induction notice, and
subsequently became an Israeli citizen and served in the Israeli
Defense Force.227 Accordingly, the Saizmann decision did not
directly address prosecutorial obligation in cases where the
defendant was seeking to avoid prosecution. Nevertheless, the
Salzmann court concluded that "Rule 5(d) [of the Second Circuit
readiness standard] is specifically addressed to those situations in
which the defendant is a fugitive and places the burden of due
diligence on the government nevertheless."=

Indeed, the court

found that the defendant and the government "share responsibility"
for delays due to failure to prosecute a missing defendant.n
The extent of the obligation created by Salzmann was an open
question for twelve years after the Salzmann decision. In United
States v. DiacoliosOthe Second Circuit reiterated that prosecutors
retained an obligation to exercise due diligence in locating a
defendant who is "a fugitive located in a foreign country."3' The

circumstances of Diacolios, although still involving a defendant
who was "unavailable" rather than "absent," were somewhat more
ambiguous than those of Salzmann. Although the defendant's
location was known to the prosecution, he had fled the jurisdiction
after committing fraud and could thus be reasonably held to have
been a fugitive avoiding prosecution.232 Nevertheless, the issue of
due diligence in locating "absent" defendants remained.
In
26id.
227 Id.

2Id. at 1156.
229

Id. at 1165-66.

2" 837

F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1988).
" Id. at 82. For a comprehensive discussion of the Diacolios decision, see
generally Green, supra note 25, at pts. 4-6.
23See Diacolios, 837 F.2d at 80-81.
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Raybom v. Scully,233 handed down the same year as Diacolios, the
Second Circuit resolved this question in favor of recognizing an
obligation of due diligence even in locating a defendant who was in
hiding, and furthermore held that this requirement was a Sixth
Amendment obligation binding on state authorities.234
The Rayborn decision was the end result of a judicial comedy of
errors lasting seven years and covering three jurisdictions. The
defendant, Henry Rayborn, was accused of the 1971 shooting of
Jessie Lee Starks in New York City. 35 Shortly afterward,
Philadelphia police notified New York authorities that they had
arrested him on an unrelated charge.236 Pursuant to a warrant
issued by the New York County Criminal Court, New York City
detectives traveled to Philadelphia to arrest Rayborn, only to
discover that he had been released.237 Following their failure to
apprehend him, the New York City detectives obtained a warrant
for his arrest in Philadelphia. 38 On the same day, Rayborn failed
to appear in court on the Philadelphia charge. 39
Nothing further occurred in the Rayborn case until 1974, when he
was arrested in Philadelphia on yet another charge. 40
Subsequently, New York authorities obtained an extradition warrant
for Raybom; however, since they failed to do so in a timely
manner, the Philadelphia court was required to release him on
bail.24 ' Unaware that he had been released, two New York City
detectives again traveled to Philadelphia in an unsuccessful attempt
to apprehend him. 242 Not unexpectedly, Rayborn jumped bail, and
also failed to appear at a subsequent federal court date on an
outstanding narcotics charge. 43
233 858 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1988).
235

Id. at 90-91; see also Green, supra note 25, at 491 n.240-41.
Rayborn, 858 F.2d at 85-86.

236

Id.

234

237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id.

id.
241 id.
242 Id.
240

243

Id.
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In April 1976, Rayborn was finally arrested in Philadelphia and
prosecuted on the charges against him in Philadelphia and in federal
court.2' However, due to clerical errors on the part of the New
York County District Attorney's office, the New York homicide
charge was not prosecuted for a further two years. 45 It was not
until October 6, 1978 that he was returned to New York and
subsequently convicted of second-degree murder."4
Even in a case such as Rayborn, where the defendant was in
hiding and failed to appear in court on at least three separate
occasions, the Second Circuit recognized an obligation on the part
of prosecutors to conduct a diligent search.247 The effect of the
Raybom decision is to call into question the constitutionality of
CPL § 30.30(4)(c) which contains no obligation of due diligence in
searching for a fugitive defendant who is intentionally avoiding
prosecution.
A constitutional challenge to CPL § 30.30(4)(c), however, would
be of dubious validity. The obligation of due diligence in locating
fugitive defendants has not been recognized outside the Second
Circuit, 2"s and it is far from clear how the Supreme Court would
rule on the validity of the statute. Moreover, CPL § 30.30 does not
directly protect a defendant's right to speedy trial, but is rather a
readiness rule that goes considerably beyond the constitutional
standard recognized by the Supreme Court and by the New York
State Court of Appeals. 2 9 Nevertheless, there can be no trial speedy or otherwise - unless the prosecution is ready. The rationale
behind readiness rules is that there is a period beyond which further
delay creates a presumption that the defendant's right to speedy trial
has been violated.m Accordingly, any tolling of the readiness
deadline imposed on the prosecution would at least indirectly
implicate the right to speedy trial.
2

44Id. at 86-87.

245 Id.

246 id.

at 87.

Id. at 90-91.
Green, supra note 25, at 455.
249 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); People v. Taranovich, 37
N.Y.2d 442, 335 N.E.2d 303, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1975).
25 United States v. Salzmann, 417 F. Supp. 1139, 1149 (E.D.N.Y.1976).
247

248
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Even a successful constitutional challenge to CPL § 30.30(4)(c),
however, would likely be a pyrrhic victory for the challenger.
Although the Diacolios and Rayborn courts recognized an
obligation of due diligence in pursuing fugitive defendants, recent
trial court decisions in the Second Circuit have recognized that
prosecutorial due diligence must be determined in light of the facts
of the case.5' Law enforcement authorities "are not expected to
make heroic efforts to apprehend a defendant who is purposefully
avoiding apprehension or who has fled to parts unknown. " 25 Nor
does due diligence "require the government to pursue that which is
futile." 53 In the context of the fugitive defendant, the minimal
efforts undertaken by the New York authorities in apprehending
Rayborn - obtaining a bench warrant in Philadelphia and acting on
the Philadelphia authorities' communications regarding his arrests were held to satisfy the obligation of due diligence. 5 4 Should a
successful constitutional challenge be mounted to CPL
§ 30.30(4)(c), the New York Legislature or the New York courts
could essentially re-establish the status quo by defining a standard
of due diligence which would merely require the prosecution to
ascertain that the defendant is in fact a fugitive and afterward issue
appropriate bulletins to outside authorities.
Nor is it likely that a fugitive defendant could defeat the
provisions of CPL § 30.30(4)(c) by bringing a habeas corpus
petition in a federal court. In that situation, the prosecutor's
exercise of due diligence would be judged, not in light of the
mechanical requirements of CPL § 30.30, but in light of the Barker
test for speedy trial violation, under which the reason for the delay
is only one of four factors" 5 The prosecution's failure to exercise

See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, No. 95 CR. 154, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9948 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1996) ("The Sixth Amendment does not fix a
minimum standard of diligence for speedy trial purposes.").
252 Rayborn, 858 F.2d at 90.
5 United States v. Diacolios, 837 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1988).
z Rayborn, 858 F.2d at 91; see also Green, supra note 25, at 499-500.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-31 (1972); see also supra notes 7277 and accompanying text.
251
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due diligence
is not sufficient in itself to establish a speedy trial
25 6
claim.
Moreover, the third and fourth factors in the Barker test - the
defendant's assertion of his right to speedy trial and prejudice
suffered by the delay - will nearly always weigh against the
fugitive.'
As "a defendant who is in hiding will not be in a
position to seek a speedy trial,""' the third factor will always weigh
in the prosecutor's favor. In addition, the question of prejudice will
likely be resolved in favor of the prosecution, as "a defendant who
is living in hiding cannot plausibly complain about the anxiety of
living under indictment ...[and] [o]rdinarily, it would be fair to
assume that the prosecution's case was impaired as much as, or
more than, the [fugitive] defendant's case." 9 Even the second
Barker factor - the reason for delay - will be neutral rather than

weighing in favor of the defendant if the defendant's fugitive status
as well as lack of prosecutorial due diligence is to blame.' The
defendant will likely do no better under a Taranovich analysis in a
New York State court; even though the defendant's assertion of his
right to speedy trial is not a factor under Taranovich, the factor
replacing it - length of pretrial incarceration - will necessarily weigh

against a fugitive who has never been incarcerated. Thus, the
constitutional obligation created by the Second Circuit in Rayborn
provides defendants with "almost, if not quite, a right without a
remedy."26' The constitutionality of CPL § 30.30(4)(c) is sound or,
at worst, easily repairable without the necessity for any change in
its practical effect.
B. Mass Productionof Warrants: An End Rm Around the
Constitution?
The open question which poses far more practical implication is
that created by the elimination of any due diligence obligation in
216 Rayborn,

858 F.2d at 89.

1 Green, supra note 25, at 501-02.
25 1 d.at 501.
29 Id. at 502.
260
1 Id.at 501.
261 Id. at 502.
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cases where a bench warrant has been issued. In the period before
Bolden, at least one trial court predicted that the lack of a due
diligence requirement would "encourage a practice of filing and
forgetting warrants" in order to circumvent the People's obligation
under CPL § 30.30.262 The Bolden court itself recognized that "the
Legislature did not intend the bench warrants to be treated as empty
263
paper symbols.
With the 1996 amendments, there is a very real possibility that
such a policy might come into existence. Once a defendant has
been arraigned, prosecutors will be able to eliminate any further
obligation of due diligence in searching for him by the simple
expedient of obtaining a bench warrant. Although the amended
statute eliminates the loophole under which offenders such as
Fernando Luperon obtained dismissal of the charges against them,
it does not sufficiently protect defendants who fall victim to
administrative errors in the judicial system or who are unable to
appear in court due to circumstances beyond their control. For
example, a defendant who is released and then never informed of a
subsequent court date, as in People v. Drummond,2' 6 would no
longer be able to claim the benefit of the delay caused by this
prosecutorial error if a bench warrant is issued for his arrest.
Similarly, a defendant such as Mark Brooks, who attempted to
answer an outstanding bench warrant but was told by both police
and court officials that there were no outstanding charges against
him,2 65 would not be protected under the 1996 amendments because
he had previously been arrested and released or appeared in court.
In his dissent to Luperon, Judge Bellacosa acknowledged that
prosecutors should not be entitled to claim the benefit of delays
resulting from missing defendants if "they adopt a uniform policy
of not churning their available law enforcement resources in
262

People v. Garrett, 146 Misc. 2d 919, 926, 553 N.Y.S.2d 948, 952 (Sup.

Ct. Kings County 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 171 A.D.2d 153, 575
N.Y.S.2d 93) (2d Dep't 1991).
263 People v. Bolden, 81 N.Y.2d 146, 154, 613 N.E.2d 145, 149, 597
N.Y.S.2d 270 (1993).

215 A.D.2d 579, 627 N.Y.S.2d 55 (2d Dep't 1995).
People v. Brooks, 146 Misc. 2d 955, 565 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1990).
264

265
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chasing after ...fugitives from justice." 266 Even under the 1996
amendments, a defendant should at the very least be able to claim
the benefit of delays resulting from such a uniform policy of failure
to enforce bench warrants. Such a policy is likely to be difficult to
prove; accordingly, it may also be necessary to establish a
rebuttable presumption that the prosecution did not intend to
enforce a bench warrant if it is left inactive for an unreasonable
period of time. In addition, the period subsequent to any
administrative error which prevents the defendant from responding
to a warrant or appearing in court should be chargeable to the
prosecution, as a defendant in this situation is in a position
analogous to one who has never been informed of the charges
against him.
CONCLUSION
The 1996 amendment to CPL § 30.30(4)(c) represent the
culmination of a 25-year attempt to find the proper balance of
responsibilities in bringing missing defendants into court. Although
the amendment was necessary inorder to prevent fugitives such as
Fernando Luperon from claiming the benefit of their
nonappearance, it perhaps goes too far in allowing prosecutors to
evade their obligation of due diligence simply by obtaining a bench
warrant. Although CPL § 30.30(4)(c) most likely conforms to the
constitutional requirements set down by federal and New York
courts in speedy trial cases, justice demands that it be further
amended or interpreted so as to protect defendants who are
prevented from appearing in court through administrative errors
rather than through their own deliberate action. The requirement of
due diligence as defined by the New York courts is not an
oppressive one, and it should continue to protect defendants who
fail to appear in court through no fault of their own.
2166
People

v. Luperon, 85 N.Y.2d 71, 87, 647 N.E.2d 1243, 1252, 623
N.Y.S.2d 735 (1995) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting); see also People v. Leone,
105 A.D.2d 757, 758, 481 N.Y.S.2d 186, 187 (2d Dep't 1984); People v.
Bratton, 103 A.D.2d 368, 370, 480 N.Y.S.2d 324, 325 (2d Dep't 1984).
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